VMI Essays:
The Virginia Military Institute And The
Equal Protection Clause: A Factual And
Legal Introduction by Soderberg, Jon Allyn
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 50 | Issue 1 Article 5
Winter 1-1-1993
VMI Essays: The Virginia Military Institute And
The Equal Protection Clause: A Factual And Legal
Introduction
Jon Allyn Soderberg
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Education Law Commons, and the Law
and Gender Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jon Allyn Soderberg, VMI Essays: The Virginia Military Institute And The Equal Protection Clause: A
Factual And Legal Introduction, 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 15 (1993),
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol50/iss1/5
VMI ESSAYS
THE VIRGINIA MILITARY INSTITUTE AND THE
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE: A FACTUAL AND
LEGAL INTRODUCTION
[T]his case is of historic importance because it will test whether the
sweep of the Equal Protection Clause is so broad, blind, and
unbending as to mandate absolute sameness of treatment for males
and females in higher education, even where it would mean the
destruction of an educational program of immense value to the
Commonwealth and the Nation, and even where no meaningful
enhancement in the educational opportunities available to women
would result.'
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit's decision
in United States v. Virginia2 engendered a diversity of opinion regarding
the compatibility of state supported single-sex educational institutions with
the United States Constitution. Following the court's decision, an onslaught
of editorials and letters to editors appeared in the national newspapers, each
author either attacking the "invidious discrimination and stereotyping"
perpetuated by publicly funded all-male educational institutions, or cham-
pioning the merits of a single-gender educational experience. 3 Caught in the
cross-fire of this debate is the Virginia Military Institute (VMI). Most of
the editorial writers focused on the red herring issue of whether the differ-
ences in physical, mental, and emotional capabilities between men and
women are sufficiently significant to necessitate single-sex admissions policies
at military schools. 4 The dispositive issue in the case, however, was whether
1. VMI Defendants' Pre-Trial Memorandum at 4, United States v. Virginia, 766 F.
Supp. 1407 (W.D. Va. 1991) (No. 90-0126-R), vacated, 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992), petition
for cert. filed (Jan. 19, 1993).
2. 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992).
3. Compare Douglas W. Kmiec, Single-Sex Schools Aren't Unconstitutional, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 14, 1992, at A15 (arguing that State funded single-sex military school is constitutional
because it serves important public purpose by providing better learning environment for some
students and some purposes and because State already provides ample coeducational options);
with A Legal Lesson for VMI, N.Y. Tuss, Oct. 14, 1992, at A24 (arguing that single-sex
admissions policy of State funded military college is unconstitutional and that school should
open up program to women because women "warrant the chance to show, as women have
shown at the service academies, that women can be every bit as good soldiers and ready to
answer a call to battle [as men]") [hereinafter Lesson for VMI].
4. See, e.g., R.C. Copeland, Jr., Mixing the Sexes in Military Modes, WASH. TIMs,
Oct. 14, 1992, at G2 (arguing that admission of females to previously all-male military college
would require drastic changes to accommodate women and would prohibit institution from
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the Equal Protection Clause permits a state to provide a single-sex higher
education institution for males while not providing a similar institution for
females.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
VMI is located in Lexington, Virginia. It was established by an act of
the state legislature in 1839 as the nation's first state military college.
Since its founding, VMI has admitted only males to its four-year
undergraduate degree program. VMI offers undergraduate degrees in liberal
arts, the sciences, and engineering; it offers no graduate or post-graduate
degree programs. The student body at VMI is composed of a corps of
cadets. All cadets must live in the VMI barracks.
The educational program at VMI pervades all aspects of the cadets'
lives. During the first seven months at VMI, all new cadets, called "rats,"
are subjected to a stressful orientation process referred to as the "rat line."
The rat line is designed to be comparable to the Marine Corps boot camp
in terms of its physical rigor and mental stress. The rat line includes
indoctrination, minute regulation of individual behavior, frequent punish-
ments, rigorous physical education, and military drills. VMI's catalogue
describes the rat system as "equal and impersonal in its application, tending
to remove wealth and former station in life as factors in one's standing as
a cadet, and ensuring equal opportunity for all to advance by personal
effort and enjoy those returns that are earned."
' 5
The class system at VMI involves the peer assignment of privileges and
responsibilities, including supervisory roles, to classes of cadets based on
rank. The "dyke" system, which closely interfaces with the rat line, assigns
each rat to a first classman or "senior" in conventional collegiate nomen-
clature, who serves as a mentor ("dyke") to the rat. The dyke system
functions to create cross-class bonding and provide an infrastructure for
leadership and support.
All VMI cadets are subject to the institution's honor code which is
pithily stated in the same austerity that characterizes all aspects of the VMI
experience: "[A cadet] 'does not lie, cheat, steal nor tolerate those who
do.' 6 There is a single sanction froy honor code violations: expulsion from
the institution. The barracks life at VMI is considered essential to VMI's
"trainfing] young men to their full potential"); Bruce Fein, What VMI Ruling Could Have
Added, WAsH. Tmms, Oct. 14, 1992, at G1 (arguing that because of fundamental differences
between sexes, all combat positions in Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force should be limited
to males).
Interestingly, both sides of the debate pointed to the experiences at the national service
academies in support of their respective arguments. See, e.g., Lesson for VMI, supra note 3
at A24 (arguing that experience at service academies demonstrate that women soldiers can be
as effective as male soldiers).
5. VIRGoNA MILITARY INSTITUTE, 1990-91 CATALOGUE 7.
6. United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1423 (W.D. Va. 1991), vacated, 976
F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992), petition for cert. filed (Jan. 19, 1993).
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program, especially in creating an egalitarian environment. Each cadet class
is assigned to one floor in the four-story barracks. Three to five cadets are
assigned to one room. The rooms in the barracks are stark and unattractive.
There are no locks on the doors to the rooms and the windows are
uncovered. Access to bathrooms is provided by outside corridors visible to
the quadrangle, and there is a complete lack of privacy in the barracks,
where cadets are subjected to complete scrutiny and minute regulation of
behavior. This complete absence of privacy and behavioral regulation is
designed to foster an egalitarian ethos and maintain a stressful environment.
The military program and its emphasis on regulation, etiquette, and
drill, is inextricably intertwined with the educational experience at VMI.
Each cadet must participate in an ROTC program throughout his four years
at VMI. Because VMI's educational program is physically intense and
requires a complete deprivation of privacy, both the district court and the
Fourth Circuit recognized that the admission of women would necessitate
fundamental changes in the VMI program due to the different social
dynamics between men and women.
Although the trial court transcript was replete with testimony regarding
the benefits of single-sex environments in higher education and although
members of both sexes seem to recognize the advantages conferred by single-
sex educational institutions,7 currently, VMI is one of only four public state
supported single-sex institutions of higher education in the country. The
other three institutions are the Citadel, which is a military college for men
located in Charleston, South Carolina and is a substantially similar insti-
tution to VMI, 8 Texas Women's University in Denton, Texas, and Douglas
College in New Jersey, which is a women's college and is part of the
Rutgers University system.
VMI is financially supported by the Commonwealth of Virginia and is
subject to the control of the General Assembly.9 VMI is governed by a
Board of Visitors, which is responsible for determining "the terms upon
which cadets may be admitted [to VMI], their number, the course of their
instruction, the nature of their service, and the duration thereof." 10 Virgi-
7. The Fourth Circuit noted that "all parties appear to acknowledge, as did the district
court, the positive and unique aspects of [VMI]." United States v. Virginia, 967 F.2d 890,
894 (4th Cir. 1992); see Suzanne Fields, Assault on VMI Could Backfire on Feminists, ATLANTA
J. & CONST., Oct. 8, 1992, at A12 (explaining that those who support single-sex education for
women believe that women thrive as leaders in all fields at colleges where they do not have
to compete with men and that this realization is reflected in increasing enrollment at women's
colleges). Approximately 64,000 women and 11,400 men attend single-sex colleges. Id.
8. The Citadel has come under similar fire for its all-male admissions policy. Three
female veterans have sued the school for access to some of its classes. In response, South
Carolina's Higher Education Commissioner has asked the Citadel to admit women to avoid a
court battle to defend the school's admissions policy which, according to the'Commissioner,
the school would inevitably lose. The Citadel Told to Admit Women, WASiH. Tmiws, Oct. 31,
1992, at A2.
9. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-92 (Michie 1985).
10. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-104 (Michie 1985).
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nia's fifteen state supported institutions of higher education are generally
supervised by the State Council of Higher Education. The Virginia General
Assembly assigns various responsibilities to the Council of Higher Education,
including the responsibility "[t]o review and approve or disapprove any
proposed change in [a Virginia institution of higher education's] statement
of mission," however, the General Assembly delegates each institution the
authority to change its mission and to establish admissions criteria., Ac-
cording to the May 16, 1986 final report of the Mission Study Committee
of the VMI Board of Visitors, which was cited by the Fourth Circuit, VMI's
mission is to produce "citizen-soldiers ... educated and honorable men
who are suited for leadership in civilian life and who can provide military
leadership when necessary." 12 As the Fourth Circuit noted in its opinion,
VMI's mission focuses on character development and leadership training
through a unique and intense adversative process that "emphasizes physical
rigor, mental stress, absolute equality of treatment, absence of privacy,
minute regulation of behavior, and indoctrination of values."' 3
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On March 1, 1990, the United States filed suit against the Common-
wealth of Virginia, the Governor of Virginia, VMI, its Superintendent and
Board of Visitors, and the State Council of Higher Education and its
members and director. The suit alleged that the defendants, "by maintaining
a policy of limiting admission to the four year undergraduate degree program
of VMI to males only," had discriminated on the basis of sex in violation
of the Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. section 2000c-6,
and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 4 The
action, filed in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Virginia, sought to enjoin permanently the defendants from discriminating
on the basis of gender in the operation of VMI.
The ironies in the VMI case are pronounced. Virginia's Governor,
Douglas Wilder, the nation's only black governor, was cast against the
forces of gender integration when only a few decades before the forces of
racial segregation forced him to attend law school out of state. The attorney
general for the Commonwealth of Virginia, Mary Sue Terry, the first woman
elected to statewide office in Virginia's history, was catapulted into the
middle of this controversy as a defender of VMI's all-male admissions policy
by virtue of her position as Attorney General.
11. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-9.6:1(b) (Michie 1985).
12. United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp 1407, 1425 (W.D. Va. 1991), vacated, 976
F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992), petition for cert. filed (Jan. 19, 1993).
13. United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 893 (4th Cir. 1992). The adversative process,
as adopted at VMI, "is designed to foster in VMI cadets doubts about previous beliefs and
experiences and to instill in cadets new values which VMI seeks to impart." Id.
14. Brief for the United States as Appellant, at 2, United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d
890 (4th Cir. 1992) (No. 91-1690).
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The VMI foundation and Terry clashed at the outset of the litigation.
Terry's legal strategy for defending VMI was criticized by some who
suggested that she was intentionally pursuing a tack that would placate VMI
alumni by appearing to vigorously defend VMI's singfe-sex admissions
policy, while ultimately satisfying her female supporters by insuring that
VMI would lose the law suit. The VMI foundation's argument was premised
on the contention that forced admission of women to VMI would funda-
mentally alter the educational experience that VMI provides to young men.
The experience "combines a demanding academic program with a rigid
disciplinary system in the classroom and in the barracks," and arguably
cannot be duplicated in a coeducational environment. 5
Terry's argument was predicated upon the assertion that Virginia has
an important interest in preserving the diversity of the state supported
system of higher education and maintaining a balance in the educational
choices offered to its citizens. 16 Terry argued that VMI's admissions policy
is substantially related to the achievement of the Commonwealth's interest
because (1) VMI's residential military program for men contributes to this
diversity and balance, and (2) admission of women would eliminate one of
only two institutions within Virginia that offer a single gender experience
for men.' 7 Terry's argument also asserted that VMI's program is not
inherently superior to educational programs offered at other institutions
within the state system. 8 The evidence elicited at trial revealed that the
experience offered at VMI is "unique," however, VMI supporters argued
that VMI's uniqueness does not render it inherently superior.
On March 26, 1990, Terry filed an answer on behalf of the Common-
wealth, VMI, and its Board of Visitors and Superintendent. Terry also filed
a counterclaim seeking declaratory relief that VMI's male-only admissions
policy was lawful. Governor Wilder filed a motion to dismiss himself as a
defendant from the case. After the trial judge denied Governor Wilder's
motion, Wilder filed an answer to the United States' complaint stating that
the failure of VMI to admit females to the institution was against his
personal philosophy and that it was his opinion that no person should be
denied admittance to a state supported school because of his or her gender.' 9
Governor Wilder also stated, however, that despite the fact that VMI's
admissions policy was against his personal philosophy, he would abide by
the court's decision to the full extent of his authority. 20
15. VMI Foundation Complaint at 4.
16. VMI Complaint at 4.
17. Id. at 16.
18. Id. at 6. Terry's complaint pointed out that the ROTC program at Virginia Tech
provides females with the benefits of a military-disciplined lifestyle, including the opportunity
to develop leadership skills within an organized and uniformed cadet corps residing in a
dormitory barracks. Id.
19. Joint Appendix at 42.
20. Brief of Appellees, at 9, United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992) (No.
91-1690).
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In November 1990, United States District Judge Jackson Kiser granted
permissive intervention to the VMI Foundation and the VMI Alumni As-
sociation to defend VMI's all-male admissions policy. Judge Kiser also
dismissed the State Council of Higher Education and its members and
director from the case and stayed the proceedings as to the Commonwealth
which, along with Governor Wilder, 21 agreed to be bound by the litigation.
On November 28, 1990, Virginia Attorney General Mary Sue Terry sought
to withdrawal as counsel for the Commonwealth, VMI, and its Superinten-
dent and Board of Visitors. Terry based this motion upon the assertion
that a conflict of interest existed between the positions of the Commonwealth
and the other named defendants. In a letter to Governor Wilder, Terry
explained that in the absence of a statute expressing the Virginia General
Assembly's view on the policy issue, Governor Wilder's position was "per-
suasive" as to the Commonwealth's policy and inconsistent with VMI's
position. Terry also asserted that she could not continue to represent the
Commonwealth because she had received confidential information in con-
nection with her representation of VMI. Judge Kiser granted Attorney
General Terry's motion to withdraw, and counsel for the VMI Foundation
and Alumni Association were appointed as substitute counsel for the re-
maining defendants.22 Terry appointed private counsel to represent the
Commonwealth of Virginia pro bono, stating in the letter of appointment
that 'It]his appointment is necessitated as a result of the Governor's artic-
ulation of an educational policy position on behalf of the Commonwealth
contrary to that of the VMI Board of Visitors." 3
LEGAL BACKGROUND
Because genuine psychological and physiological differences exist be-
tween gender groups, the Constitution tolerates laws that discriminate be-
tween the two sexes. Unlike laws that discriminate on the basis of race-
which are usually born of invidious stereotyping and racial animus-laws
that discriminate on the basis of gender may result from fundamental
psychological and physiological differences between males and females. The
problem posed to legislatures and courts is to determine correctly whether
these fundamental differences are substantial enough in a given context to
justify discriminatory treatment under the law.
In the context of equal protection, both through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and as embodied in the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, the
courts assess different types of classifications under varying standards of
judicial review. For equal protection problems involving suspect classifica-
tions such as classifications based upon race, the classification is assayed
21. Governor Wilder was represented by counsel at trial, but he did not testify, present
any evidence, or cross-examine any witnesses. Id.
22. District Court Docket Sheet at 2.
23. Brief For United States As Appellant, at 5, United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890
(4th Cir. 1992) (No. 91-1690).
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under a "strict scrutiny" standard. The strict scrutiny standard is two-
pronged: (1) the discrimination or classification must be justified by a
compelling state or governmental interest; and (2) there must be no less
discriminatory means to advance that interest.2 The strict scrutiny test
almost inexorably leads to the invalidation of the governmental policy or
objective because courts are suspicious that such classifications are more
often than not based on prejudice, stereotype or animus toward the group
being discriminated against. Under the strict scrutiny test, little or no
deference is given to the government and the strong tendency is to strike
the classification.
The United States Supreme Court's application of the Equal Protection
Clause towards gender-based classifications is considerably more flexible
than its application of the Equal Protection Clause to race-based classifi-
cations.Y Under the mid-level scrutiny test, the Court neither prohibits the
use of all gender classifications (as it does in cases involving race-based
classifications under the strict scrutiny test), nor does it defer to legislative
decisions (as it does in cases involving economic-based classifications). The
Court's application of the Equal Protection Clause to gender-based classi-
fications are essentially ad hoc evaluations that depend on whether justices
view the challenged law as one that is based upon gender stereotypes or is
designed to advance an "important" governmental interest.6 The second
prong of the mid-level test, the determination of whether the challenged
law bears a "substantial relationship" to the achievement of an important
governmental objective, is in essence an ad hoc balancing test that allows
the justices to adjust the necessary relationship in light of the substantiality
of the asserted governmental interest at stake. In actuality, the more
important the asserted governmental interest at stake, the more likely the
24. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding that when government
makes differentiations between persons exercising fundamental rights such differentiations-
cannot be upheld unless government can demonstrate that classification is necessary to promote
compelling interest).
25. The "strict scrutiny" or "compelling interest" that the Court applies in cases
involving race-based classifications almost inexorably results in the invalidation of the challenged
law. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 434 (1984) (holding that state court could not
remove infant child from custody of its natural mother simply because mother had married
person of different race); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (striking down
doctrine of separate but equal in context of public education).
26. Compare Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (holding that no legitimate
reason for denying female member of uniformed services right to claim her spouse as dependent
for purposes of obtaining increased quarters allowances and medical and dental benefits) and
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S 71 (1971) (finding no legitimate interest served by preferring male
applicants over female applicants for position of administrator of intestate estates); with
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (upholding statutory requirement that provided for
discharge of male naval line officers passed over for promotion after nine years of service,
while women officers passed over for promotion were not discharged until after thirteen years,
because statute compensated for fewer opportunities for women line officers for promotion
[due to exclusion of women from all combat and most sea duty]).
19931
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:15
Court will find that a law that creates a gender-based classification is
sufficiently related to the achievement of that interest.
In Craig v. Boren,27 the Supreme Court defined the intermediate scrutiny
test appropriate for the examination of sex-based classifications. "To with-
stand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications
by gender must serve [sic] important governmental objectives and must be
substantially related to achievement of those objectives. ' 28 Thus, a sex-
based admissions policy may be upheld in the face of constitutional challenge
"only by showing at least that the classification serves 'important govern-
mental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed' are 'sub-
stantially related to the achievement of those objectives."' 29 The state's
proffered interest must be examined carefully to determine whether it
"reflects archaic and stereotypic notions" of the sexes, and will be found
illegitimate if its purpose is to "exclude or 'protect' members of one gender
because they are presumed to suffer from an inherent handicap or to be
innately inferior.''30 Moreover, even if the asserted interest is legitimate and
important, there must still be shown a "direct, substantial relationship
between objective and means. ' 31 The burden is met only by showing at
least that the discrimination serves important governmental objectives and
that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives.1
2
Although the test for determining the validity of a gender-based clas-
sification is straightforward, it must be applied free of fixed notions
concerning the roles and abilities of males and females. Care must be taken
in ascertaining whether the statutory objective itself reflects archaic and
stereotypic notions. Thus, if the statutory objective is to exclude or "pro-
tect" members of one gender because they are presumed to suffer from an
inherent handicap or to be innately inferior, the objective itself is illegiti-
mate.3 The issue is not whether the benefitted class profits from the
classification, but whether the State's decision to confer a benefit only upon
one class by means of a discriminatory classification is substantially related
to achieving a legitimate and substantial goal.
34
CONTROLLING PRECEDENT
In Brown v. Board of Education,35 the Supreme Court overturned the
race-based doctrine of "separate but equal," declaring that "education is
27. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
28. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
29. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (quoting Wengler
v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980)); see Personnel Admin. v. Feeney, 442
U.S. 256 (1979).
30. 458 U.S. at 725.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 730.
33. Id. at 724-25.
34. Id. at 731 n.17.
35. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. '3 6 The
Brown Court noted that the quality of education is determined by more
than equality among tangible factors.
Thus, the Brown Court based its determination, that separate but equal
educational facilities for students based upon race was anathema to the
Constitution, upon the psychological harm inflicted upon children denied
the right to attend school with other children solely on the basis of race.3 7
Although the Brown Court's sweeping pronouncement that "in the field
of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place," 3
suggests a categorical ban on the use of separate but equal educational
facilities, subsequent to Brown courts have recognized exceptions to Brown's
apparent ban on separate but equal in the context of education when the
classifications are based upon gender rather than upon race. For example,
in Vorchheimer v. School District,9 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit considered a policy of the City of Philadelphia which
maintained a school system that involved four types of high schools with
different admissions requirements. 40 These schools were denominated as
technical, magnet, and comprehensive high schools that were generally open
to both sexes. The school system included two single-sex academic high
schools that offered only college prepatory classes. 41 Approximately seven
percent of the school-age population was eligible to attend the academic
schools. The plaintiff was a gifted teenage girl who graduated from her
junior high school class with honors and who would have been eligible to
attend Central High School, the boys academic high school, but for her
gender. Both Central High School and Girls High School, its female
equivalent, were "comparable in quality, academic standing, and prestige." 42
The Third Circuit held that although the plaintiff had a valid interest in an
expanded freedom of choosing the high school that she would attend, the
expansion of her choice was outweighed by the harm that providing her
expanded choice would cause. The court stated:
[A]lI public single-sex schools would have to be abolished. The
absence of these schools would stifle the ability of the local school
36. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
37. Id. at 493-95. The Court stated:
[T]he policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority
of the negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn.
Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the
educational and mental development of negro children and to deprive them of...
the benefits they would receive in a racialIly] integrated school system.
Id. at 494.
38. Id. at 495.
39. 532 F.2d 880 (3rd Cir. 1976), aff'd per curiam, 430 U.S. 703 (1977).
40. Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 532 F.2d 880, 881 (3rd Cir. 1976), aff'd per curiam,
430 U.S. 703 (1977).
41. Id. at 881.
42. Id. at 882.
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board to continue with a respected educational methodology. It
follows too that those students and parents who prefer an education
in a public, single-sex school would be denied their freedom of
choice. The existence of private schools is no more an answer to
those people than it is to the plaintiff.
43
Thus, the Third Circuit implicitly endorsed the concept of "separate but
equal" for gender classifications in education because such classifications
enhanced educational opportunities available to the benefitted class that
may not have been available otherwise.
Although the Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit's decision in
the Vorchheimer case, it did not squarely address the constitutionality of
single-sex public education until 1982 when it decided Mississippi University
for Women v. Hogan.44 Both sides in the VMI litigation agreed that the
Supreme Court's decision in Hogan controlled the outcome of this case. In
Hogan the Supreme Court addressed whether Mississippi's justification for
the policy of allowing men to audit nursing courses but not grant men
academic credit for courses at Mississippi University for Women (MUW),
a state supported institution, violated the equal protection rights of males
wishing to receive academic credit for courses at MUW. Mr. Hogan was a
registered nurse and a Mississippi resident who applied for admission to the
school of nursing, which offered baccalaureate and graduate programs in
nursing. Hogan met the qualifications for admission to the nursing program
on all counts except one, he was a male and the school restricted admissions
to females only. Thus, Hogan was denied admission to the school of nursing
solely because of his gender. Mississippi statutes, which included the charter
of the University, restricted the enrollment at MUW to women. The Supreme
Court, in a five to four vote, invalidated the exclusion of males from the
state nursing school.
The Hogan Court left unanswered the question of whether MUW could
deny men admission to other schools within the University: "we decline to
address the question of whether MUW's admissions policy, as applied to
males seeking admissions to schools other than the school of nursing,
violates the Fourteenth Amendment.1 45 Thus, the Hogan majority declined
to adopt a categorical approach against the dispensation of educational
benefits by gender.
Justice 0 'Connor's majority opinion in Hogan was written within the
framework of the Court's post-Craig mid-level scrutiny analysis. Thus, the
school's policy would be upheld only if it served important governmental
objectives and only if the discriminatory admissions policy was substantially
43. Id. at 888; see also Williams v. McNair, 316 F. Supp. 134, 138-39 (D.S.C. 1970)
(holding that all-female public liberal arts college can constitutionally deny male applicants
admission to school solely on sole basis of sex where male plaintiffs had complete range of
other state institutions to attend), aff'd, 401 U.S. 951 (1971).
44. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
45. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723 (1982).
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related to the achievement of those objectives." Mississippi justified the
school's single-sex admissions policy on the grounds that it compensated
for discrimination against women. Justice O'Connor found this proffered
justification unpersuasive because of the fact that women were not under-
represented in the field of nursing. According to Justice O'Connor, the
school's single-sex admissions policy "perpetuate[s] the stereotyped view of
nursing as an exclusively woman's job," instead of compensating for
discriminatory barriers faced by women. 47
Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist, Powell, and Chief Justice Burger dis-
sented. The dissenters, with varying degrees of conviction, suggested that
equal protection principles tolerate states providing "separate but equal"
educational benefits and opportunities based upon gender. Chief Justice
Burger dissented to emphasize that the Court's holding was very narrow
and was limited to the context of a professional nursing school. 48 Justice
Blackmun dissented musing that "I hope that we do not lose all values that
some think are worthwhile ... and relegate ourselves to needless con-
formity. ' 49 Justice Powell, joined by Justice Rehnquist, offered the most
compelling dissent. Justice Powell determined that "this is simply not a sex
discrimination case. The Equal Protection Clause was never intended to be
applied to this kind of case."' o Justice Powell argued that the majority's
opinion invariably would prohibit states from providing single-sex schools.
According to Justice Powell, as long as Hogan was provided some oppor-
tunity to receive a similar educational benefit, although at a different
location and in a slightly different form, he was treated substantially equally.
Thus, Justice Powell found no justification for judicial intervention because
Hogan could have received a similar education at another school. 5'
UNITED STATES V. VRGINIA
District Court's Opinion
The United States first challenged VMI's all-male admissions policy in
the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia. The
United States argued that as a state supported college, VMI's refusal to
admit females to the institute regardless of their qualifications violates the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. After a six-day
trial beginning on April 4, 1991, United States District Judge Jackson Kiser
concluded in a memorandum opinion that VMI's male-only admissions
policy existed within the bounds of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 Judge
46. Id. at 724.
47. Id. at 729.
48. Id. at 734 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 734-35 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 745 (Powell, J., dissenting).
51. Id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
52. United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407 (W.D. Va. 1991).
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Kiser held that VMI's practice of excluding women passed muster under
the Equal Protection Clause. 3 In reviewing VMI's admission policy, the
district court applied the intermediate scrutiny test that requires the state
to establish an important governmental objective and mandates that the
means of furthering that objective are substantially related to its achieve-
ment.
5 4
The district court found Hogan factually distinguishable from the VMI
facts. According to Judge Kiser, unlike the situation in Hogan-where the
majority of the Court found that the admission of men to nursing classes
did not affect teaching style, the performance of female students, or
otherwise frustrate the Mississippi University for Women School of Nurs-
ing's educational goals-the record abounded with evidence that VMI's
educational goals would be drastically altered by the admission of women.5
The district court also noted two other factors that distinguished Hogan
from the case at bar. First, Judge Kiser stated that the reasons proffered
to justify the discrimination were different:
In Hogan, Mississippi maintained that a female-only admissions
policy at MUW was affirmative action which was justified to
compensate women for past discrimination whereas here, Virginia
urges that a male-only admissions policy at VMI promotes diversity
within its statewide system of higher education.5 6
The district court observed that in Hogan the Court found that Mississippi's
policy failed both prongs of the intermediate scrutiny test. In contrast,
Judge Kiser explained, Virginia's policy satisfied the intermediate scrutiny
test because diversity in higher education is an important governmental
objective and maintaining a single-sex admissions policy at an institution is
the only way to attain single-gender diversity.5 7 Second, the district court
noted that unlike the plaintiff in Hogan who was a resident of the town
where the nursing school was located and thus would not have an oppor-
tunity to study nursing within commuting distance of his home if not
admitted to MUW's nursing school, VMI does not provide a commuting
option because all cadets are required to live in barracks. Judge Kiser also
noted that VMI's policy did not deny females the opportunity to study any
particular academic program because Virginia Polytechnic Institute State
University, located in Blacksburg, Virginia, offers all of the same courses
and military instruction to both male and female students.
5 8
The district court was impressed with the evidence elicited at trial which
supported the contention that both male and female students benefit from
53. Id. at 1415.
54. Id. at 1410.
55. Id. at 1411.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. But see id. at 1421 (finding that VMI experience is dramatically different from
experience offered at Virginia Tech).
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attending single-sex colleges. 59 Judge Kiser found that converting VMI from
a single-sex institution to a coeducational institution would result in changes
in methods of instructions and living conditions. Judge Kiser further ob-
served that, as the West Point experience bears out:
the presence of women would tend to distract male students from
their studies. . . . It would also increase pressures relating to dating,
which would tend to impair the esprit de corps and the egalitarian
atmosphere which are critical elements of the VMI experience. 60
The district court noted that physical changes would be necessitated by
coeducation at VMI. Allowing for personal privacy by placing locks on
doors and covers on windows, Judge Kiser observed, would change the
adversative environment. The court also observed that the introduction of
women at VMI would detract from the rigor of the physical education
requirements currently imposed on cadets. 61 Finally, the court found that
expert testimony supported the observation that the adversative model of
education is not conducive to the developmental needs of women who
typically thrive in a system that "provides more nurturing and support for
the students." 62
The district court also considered the extent to which women were
deprived of an educational opportunity by VMI's all-male admissions policy.
Judge Kiser acknowledged that "[n]o other school in Virginia or in the
United States, public or private, offers the same kind of rigorous military
training as is available at VMI." 63 However, the court aptly observed that
if VMI were to admit women its uniqueness would be lost and it would
become substantially similar to the military barracks at Virginia Tech. To
a certain degree, Judge Kiser foreshadowed the Fourth Circuit's opinion
stating that:
Gender discrimination, as a rule, works to the benefit of one group
and to the detriment of another .... Consequently, it seems to me
that the criticism which might be directed toward Virginia's higher
educational policy is not that it maintains VMI as an all-male
institution, but rather that it fails to maintain at least one all-female
institution. 4
The district court determined that VMI could remain all-male notwithstand-
ing the fact that there were no comparable public institutions available to
females only. Thus, Judge Kiser concluded that Virginia's maintenance of
an all-male military institute comported with equal protection requirements.
59. See id. at 1411-12 (reciting testimony elicited at trial which explained beneficial
effects of single-sex education).
60. Id. at 1412.
61. Id. at 1413.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1413-14.
64. Id. at 1414.
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Specifically, the court found that VMI's admission policy did not violate
the equal protection rights of females denied admission to the institute
because (1) the institute supported the substantial government interest of
maintaining diversity throughout the state educational system by preserving
"adversarial" and "barracks-oriented" educational opportunity, and (2)
because the exclusion of females was the only way to achieve this goal.
Fourth Circuit's Opinion
The Fourth Circuit heard arguments on April 8, 1992 and issued its
opinion on October 5. The court began its opinion by acknowledging the
uniqueness of the VMI experience, the success of the VMI program, and
the accomplishments of its alumni. 65 Perhaps the fact that the court gave
judicial notice to the accomplishments of VMI made the end-result of its
decision more palatable to supporters of VMI's all-male admissions policy.
Indeed, the court's obeisance to the merits and accomplishments of VMI
caused considerable confusion as to whether VMI could ultimately remain
a single-sex institution and led several commentators to believe that VMI
had "won" the case. 6
As introduction, the Fourth Circuit referred to the opening sentence in
Judge Kiser's opinion below which noted that in May 1864, during the Civil
War, VMI bravely fought Union troops at New Market, Virginia and that
in this litigation "the combatants have again confronted each other but this
time the venue is in this court.''67 Judge Neimeyer aptly noted:
What was not said [in the district court's introduction] is that the
outcome of each confrontation finds resolution in the Equal Pro-
65. United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 892-93 (4th Cir. 1992). The court noted
that:
[VMI's] graduates have distinguished themselves in the 150 years since [its founding].
A VMI professor, Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson, achieved notoriety as a confederate
general during the Civil War. The VMI cadet corps fought Union troops at New
Market, Virginia, and almost 1800 alumni (constituting 94% of all VMI graduates
at the time) fought in the Civil War. Among the thousands of alumni who have
served this country during war is General of the Army George C. Marshall, and six
have been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor. VMI graduates have achieved
similarly in civilian life. The school's success and reputation are uncontroverted in
this case.
Id. at 893.
66. See, e.g., R.C. Copeland, Jr., No Curtains for VMI, WASH. TIMs, Oct. 13, 1992,
at F2 (arguing that VMI won under Fourth Circuit's ruling); Fields, supra note 7, at A12
(stating that "[i]n politically correct America, this decision is a refreshing affirmation of
common sense, validating the lower court's judgment that women would wreck [VMI's
educational program]" in order to satisfy a superficial interpretation of equal rights); Kmiec,
supra note 2, at A15 (interpreting Fourth Circuit's decision as victory for VMI stating that
"VMI won because it proved that VMI's single-sex policy serves an important public purpose:
namely, providing a better learning environment for some students and some purposes"); VMI
Should Remain All-Male, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 1992, at A20 (arguing that Fourth Circuit's
praise for VMI's program means that VMI won its case).
67. United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 892 (4th Cir. 1992).
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tection Clause. When the Civil War was over, to assure the abolition
of slavery and the federal government's supervision over that policy,
all states, north and south, yielded substantial sovereignty to the
federal government in the ratification of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and every state for the first time was expressly directed by
federal authority not to deny any person within the state's jurisdic-
tion "equal protection of the laws"(citation omitted). The govern-
ment now relies on this clause to attack VMI's admissions policy.
68
After reviewing the appropriate analytical framework for gender clas-
sifications, the court stated in dicta:
[W]e must first decide whether VMI's male-only admissions policy,
maintained pursuant to state-delegated authority, is a classification
justified by a fair and substantial relationship with the institution's
mission of developing citizen soldiers, and this in turn leads to an
examination of whether VMI's mission would be materially altered
by the admission of women.6 9
This question is irrelevant in terms of the ultimate disposition of the case.
However, by including this dicta, the Fourth Circuit gave the VMI foundation
a Pyrrhic victory, agreeing with the VMI foundation's position that the
admission of women to VMI would fundamentally change the type of
educational experience that VMI now offers,70 while ultimately ruling against
VMI on the underlying equal protection issue.
Single-sex colleges, the court acknowledged, are positive for both sexes:
Students become more academically involved, interact with faculty frequently,
show enhanced intellectual self-esteem, and are generally more satisfied with
college life than coeducational enrollees. The court further stated that the
admission of women to VMI would detract from attributes that make
attending VMI a unique experience. The court found that the admission of
women to VMI would lower physical training standards, require accommo-
dations for privacy, and reduce the level of psychological and emotional
hardening. Male exclusiveness at VMI, according to the court, is substantially
related to sound pedagogical objectives.7 1 However, the substantiality of this
68. Id. at 895.
69. Id. at 896.
70. Id. at 898. The Fourth Circuit noted:
[T]he record supports the district court's findings that at least three aspects of VMI's
program-physical training, the absence of privacy, and the adversative approach-
would be materially affected by coeducation, leading to a substantial; change in the
egalitarian ethos which is critical aspect of VMI's training.... The district court's
conclusions that VMI's mission can be accomplished only in a single-gender envi-
ronment and that changes necessary to accommodate coeducation would tear at the
fabric of VMI's unique methodology are adequately supported.
Id. at 896.
71. Id. The focus on the fundamental changes that coeducation would visit upon VMI
has given rise to the VMI conundrum. The conundrum is that VMI's uniqueness must necessarily
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relationship is insufficient for equal protection purposes because of the context
in which male exclusiveness at VMI exists. The relationship between the male
exclusiveness at VMI and the important state interest in diversity is not
satisfied, according to the Fourth Circuit, until the state justifies its decision
not to offer females a single-sex military education of the type available to
male students.
The court rejected the government's argument that VMI's admissions
policy was based upon impermissible stereotyping and overly-broad generali-
zations. Recognizing that there are fundamental physiological and psycholog-
ical differences between men and women, the court found that single-
genderness in education can be "pedagogically justifiable." 72 The court noted
that "the data suggests that differences between a single-gender student
population and a coeducational one justify a state's offering single-gender
education.
73
After acknowledging VMI's uniqueness, however, the Fourth Circuit
shifted gears and addressed itself to the real legal question in the case: whether
the unique benefit offered by VMI can be denied to women under an asserted
state policy of diversity. Thus, the court found that in order for VMI to
prevail, it needed to show why Virginia offers the unique type of VMI
experience to men and not to women. The court noted that although VMI's
program is tailored to males, it is possible to provide a single-sex female
institution that was tailored to females.
The court rejected Judge Kiser's legal conclusion that VMI's all-male
admissions policy contributed to a state policy of gender diversity although
there were no similar public institutions for females. The court observed that
deprive women of an educational opportunity. For to admit women to VMI would forever
destroy the educational environment that differentiates VMI from other institutions supported
by the Commonwealth. The overwhelming evidence presented at trial and accepted by the
Fourth Circuit suggests that the rat system for first year cadets, barracks life with its absence
of personal privacy, and the requirement of uniform treatment are integral features of the
VMI experience that would be impossible to recreate in a coeducational institution. In theory,
Judge Neimeyer's suggestion that the Commonwealth establish a comparable institution for
women is the best solution. This would enhance educational diversity. In reality, however, this
proposed solution is infeasible. There are intangible factors that make a separate but equal
program for women infeasible. For example, any new all-female institution would be devoid
of VMI's "old boys" network, as the VMI alumni association is derisively referred to by
proponents of a co-educational VMI. The "old boys" network offers strong bonds of loyalties
and "connections" to alumni who occupy some of the most powerful and influential positions
in Virginia. Further, as Judge Kiser noted in his memorandum opinion, there is much
speculation but very little evidence concerning the demand amongst females to attend VMI.
Also, it is unlikely that Virginia would invest in the establishment of a new all-female military
institution without strong evidence indicating a substantial demand amongst females for such
an opportunity. Furthermore, the expense of establishing a new institution is prohibitive,
especially considering the fact that the Fourth Circuit's opinion was vague as to what type of
institution would suffice.
72. Id. at 898 (citing ten-year empirical study which found that single-sex colleges have
advantages over coeducational colleges in numerous areas).
73. Id.
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while providing diversity in higher education through the maintenance of
single-gender institutions may rise to the level of an important governmental
interest, VMI's all-male admissions policy did not pass the second prong of
the intermediate scrutiny test because by not offering a siilar opportunity
for women, VMI's single-gender admissions policy Was not substantially
related to an important governmental objective. 74 The court did note, however,
that diversity was an important governmental objective. But it rejected the
concept advanced by Judge Kiser that VMI passed the important governmental
interest test by showing that the admission of women to VMI would reduce
the diversity of educational options offered by the Commonwealth.
The court determined that a sufficient level of diversity, that is, a level
of diversity that would qualify as "important" under equal protection analysis,
could not be achieved by providing a single-sex educational experience to
members of one sex without offering a similar experience to members of the
other sex. Thus, the Fourth Circuit determined that, assuming arguendo that
the Commonwealth offered a similar experience to females and diversity was
achieved, VMI's single-gender admissions policy would be constitutionally
justified. The court explained that a policy of diversity which aims to provide
an array of educational opportunities, including single-gender institutions,
must do more than favor one gender. Accordingly, under the Fourth Circuit's
rationale, an all-male state-supported college or university without an all-
female counterpart does not sufficiently contribute to diversity so as to satisfy
the Equal Protection Clause.
After observing that VMI had "adequately defended a single-gender
education and training program ... but it has not adequately explained how
the maintenance of one single-gender institution gives effect to, or establishes
the existence of, the governmental objective advanced to support VMI's
admissions policy, a desire for educational diversity," 75 the court reached
three conclusions. First, the court concluded that the single-gender education,
and VMI's program in particular, is justified by a legitimate and relevant
institutional mission which favors neither sex. Second, the court concluded
that the introduction of women at VMI would materially alter the very
program in which women seek to participate. Finally, the court concluded
that the Commonwealth of Virginia, despite its announced policy of diversity,
failed to articulate an important policy that substantially supports offering
74. The court cast doubt upon VMI's contention that its male-only admissions policy
is part of a state announced policy. The court cited statements made by Governor Wilder and
Attorney General Terry, which indicated their respective lack of support for VMI's all-male
admissions policy, in support of its proposition that VMI's single-sex admissions policy is not
an official state policy. Id. at 899. VMI's lawyers were highly critical of Mary Sue Terry after
the Fourth Circuit ruling. VMI's lawyers claimed that the comments Mary Sue Terry made
when dropping out of the case in November 1990 were "inappropriate and legally incorrect."
VMI Appeals Ruling on Admissions, WASH. POST, October 20, 1992, at D5. In their request
for a rehearing en banc, VMI claimed that Terry's "inaccurate and prejudicial statements"
were made only to give herself a way of bailing out of "politically charged litigation." Id.
75. United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 899-900 (4th Cir. 1992).
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the unique benefits of a VMI-type of education to men and not to women. 76
It is because of the fundamental differences between the sexes that the
Fourth Circuit has apparently recognized an exception, in the area of gender
discrimination, to the venerable rule established in Brown v. Board of
Education77 that, separate but equal in the field of public education is
repugnant to constitutional principles. Because of the genuine differences
between the sexes that make single-gender institutions of higher education
beneficial to members of both sexes, and because such institutions provide
educational diversity within a state system of higher education, the court did
not directly order VMI to admit women. But because Virginia and VMI
failed to articulate an important government objective that supports the
offering of the unique VMI experience to men only, the Fourth Circuit
vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case to the district
court to require the Commonwealth to "formulate, adopt, and implement a
plan that conforms" to the constitutional principles which govern gender-
based classifications.78 The court further explained that "VMI's continued
status as a state institution is conditioned on the Commonwealth's satisfac-
torily addressing the findings we affirm and bringing the circumstances into
conformity with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.,
79
The court did not prescribe a specific remedial measure for the Com-
monwealth and VMI to undertake in order to comply with equal protection
requirements. Rather, the court suggested three possible measures that the
Commonwealth might undertake to satisfy the guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment: (1) admit women to VMI and adjust the program accordingly;
(2) establish a parallel institution or parallel programs to those offered at
VMI; or (3) abandon state support of VMI. The court explained that these
were merely suggestions and that VMI and the Commonwealth might be able
to come up with "other more creative options or combinations."' 0
CONCLUSION
The Fourth Circuit left Virginia with the seemingly impossible task of
divining an acceptable option that would render VMI's single-gender admis-
sions policy constitutional. The court suggested that the Commonwealth search
for "creative options" for equal opportunity for women. The inherent
ambiguity of the term "creative option" leaves the Commonwealth in an
untenable position. If the Commonwealth were to eschew the court's first
two options, for example, accepting female applicants or taking the school
private, and attempt to come up with its own alternative-a venture that
76. Id. at 900.
77. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that in field of public education doctrine of separate
but equal has no place and that separate educational facilities are inherently unequal).
78. 976 F.2d 890, 900.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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would undoubtedly require substantial state funds-it would not be guaranteed
equal protection compliance without judicial ratification. And the uncertainty
as to whether an alternative approach would suffice under the constitutional
requirements would discourage the Commonwealth form attempting this
option. The lawyers for VMI, probably realizing the precariousness of the
Commonwealth's position under the Fourth Circuit's opinion, petitioned for
an en banc rehearing which was denied on November 19, 1992.81 Judges
Widener and Hamilton voted to rehear the case, Chief Judge Ervin and
Judges Russell, Hall, Phillips, Murnaghan, Wilkins, Niemeyer, and Williams
voted to deny a rehearing en banc. Judges Wilkinson and Luttig abstained
from the decisionA2 VMI filed a petition for certiorari on January 19, 1993.83
The following two essays by Allan Ides, Professor of Constitutional Law
at Washington and Lee and Mary Cheh, Professor of Constitutional Law at
the George Washington University National Law Center address the contro-
versial and provocative issues surrounding VMI's all-male admissions policy.
. Professor Ides first discusses the scope of judicial review in the enforce-
ment of judicially created constitutional rights. Particularly, Professor Ides
examines VMI's admissions policy under the intermediate scrutiny test, ap-
plicable to gender discrimination cases, as described by the Supreme Court's
equal protection jurisprudence. Professor Ides then points out that "focusing
exclusively on the absence of an all-female VMI-style institution or program
... overlooks a much more significant and complicated question, the one
that really ought to be most pertinent: Overall, does the system of higher
education provided by the Commonwealth of Virginia discriminate on the
basis of gender?"' 4
Professor Cheh criticizes the Fourth Circuit's opinion in the VMI case
for erroneously applying the intermediate scrutiny test, acquiescing to certain
separate male and female roles, and "want[ing] to affirm that sex-segregated
education is not only allowable but desirable." '85 Professor Cheh then explores
why an all-male VMI is not a benign educational choice and suggests that a
separate VMI for men and women is constitutionally impossible because of
historical discrimination against women in the military.
JON ALLYN SODERBERG
ExEcuTvE EDITOR
81. United States v. Virginia, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 30490 (Nov. 19, 1992).
82. Id.
83. 61 U.S.L.W. 3590 (Feb. 23, 1993).
84. Allan Ides, The Curious Case of the Virginia Military Institute: An Essay on the
Judicial Function, 50 WAsH. & LEE L. Rv. 35, 45 (1993).
85. Mary M. Cheh, An Essay on VMI and Military Service: Yes, We Do Have to Be
Equal Together, 50 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 49, 54-55 (1993).
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